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Summary of Conclusions  
 
Until January 1, 2007 Belarus enjoyed considerably lower prices for gas and crude oil from 
Russia as compared with either market demand or that which other Russian neighbors were 
charged. Cheap energy was in fact a tool of the Kremlin’s economic, and consequently 
political, support for Lukashenka’s regime. But at the end of March 2006, right after the 
presidential elections that confirmed Lukashenka in office for another five years, Gazprom 
made it clear that it was set to raise gas prices starting in 2007. Senior Russian officials, 
including Putin, said the increases were a move away from the provision of subsidized 
supplies for Belarus toward transparent market pricing. This paper covers the current 
situation and predicts possible development of these, lately rather rocky, relations. Besides, 
it also argues that there is no foundation for serious change in Minsk toward Moscow.     
 
Belarusian opposition parties and a number of Belarusian analysts (mainly economists) 
interpreted the new “market” measures as the unwillingness of the Kremlin to continue 
support for Lukashenka’s regime. The energy row between Russia and Belarus which 
erupted over the transition fees for crude oil and not for increase in gas prices represents 
the worst of last year’s conflict between the two countries. The Kremlin is definitely 
attempting to purchase a controlling share in strategic Belarusian enterprises, including 
Beltransgaz, and to expand its political and economic influence in Belarus. They are 
supported by the belief that Lukashenka and his allies have no way out, that they have lost 
space for political maneuvering and that a possible regime change could bring them to trial.2  
                                                 
1 The opinions presented of the paper are those of the authors only and not necessarily represent of those of the 
Pontis Foundation.  
2 In case of regime break-up, Lukashenka and his allies might avoid persecution and stay safe only in Russia. It is 
highly unlikely they will seek political asylum in other countries (Iran, Lebanon, China, etc.) due to differences in 
living standard and culture. 
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From the viewpoint of Moscow, Lukashenka did everything possible to deteriorate relations 
with the West and is unable to improve them at this point. The Kremlin realizes that 
Lukashenka’s regime remains highly dependent on Russia’s economic support and believes 
that Russia’s persistent economic and political pressure will ensure desired outcomes, at 
least an enhanced position of Russia in Belarusian politics and economy. Nevertheless, the 
agreements reached, regarding both gas price and stocks, disguise a great potential for 
further conflict.  
 
While Russia’s economical and political interests in Belarus are clear, the rationale behind 
Lukashenka’s energy policy is harder to explain, as it has various economic, social and 
political consequences. Despite the change in rhetoric toward the West, the Lukashenka 
regime pledges full support to the Kremlin in its political conflicts with Western democracies 
and still ensures the expansion of Russia’s influence in the post-Soviet sphere of influence. 
Due to its geo-political status, Belarus enjoys international influence which is completely 
inconsistent with its economic potential and population size. This, a key transit country 
between East and West is allowing Lukashenka to run a relatively independent policy both 
toward East and West, but made the bill paid for the economic and social stability of Belarus 
by (up until now) Russia. This schism sits at the very heart of Belarus-Russia relations, 
which is the thread that will determine the development of Belarus over the next few years. 
Basically, there are two concepts clashing in Belarus: Lukashenka’s efforts to normalize 
relations (e.g. via subsidies as a loyal Russian ally) on one hand and Russia’s new CIS policy 
on the other.   
 
Despite dialogue with the West, which seems to indicate that there is no firm belief in Minsk, 
the position of the Belarusian government continues - to deteriorate the situation further by  
blackmailing Moscow in the hopes of achieving more favorable conditions (e.g. to undo the 
change in the subsidization policy). Now, it is up to the opposition and civil society to make 
Belarusian society aware of these deficiencies and to formulate alternative policies. Control 
and manageability for the sake of political stability have been the key principles of Belarus’ 
authoritarian regime. These principles greatly impeded the country’s development and 
suppressed civil society. In the mid-90’s Belarus’ intelligentsia - Lukashenka’s opponents - 
believed Belarus was building a “Soviet-kolkhoz” political model. Twelve years later, 
Belarusian analysts compare the Lukashenka regime to “Asian tigers”, based mainly on 
official reports of economic growth assured by increases in the productive capacity of state 
enterprises. However, the suppression of private initiative leads to a steady decline in the 
number of entrepreneurs. Cheap Russian energy supplies have boosted production growth, 
regardless of the lack of structural economic reforms, the privatization of large enterprises 
and economic dependence on state policy. This should be the bottom line of the alternative.  
 
The Freedom Day on March 25, 2007 will show whether the spirit from the last election 
remains in Belarus. The following era determine the future of Belarus will be shaped by two 
key factors - development in Minsk and Moscow.  Now is the time to seize the moment in 
Minsk – at least up until the next Russian presidential elections (early 2008) and the 
Belarusian parliamentary elections that will follow (October 2008).     
 
 
Cheap gas - calm society    
 
According to the majority of Belarusian voters, Lukashenka managed to establish and 
maintain a fruitful relationship with Russia that allowed for cheap, stable gas supplies. 
However, many observers (including experts) believe gas price increases will destroy the 
Belarusian economy and aggravate social problems. As such, the maintenance of this belief 
concerning gas prices is crucial for the authorities to avoid (immediate) social unrest. Cheap 
natural gas ensures Lukashenka’s popularity within Belarusian society. However, if Russia 
starts writing off the difference between “actual” and market prices, Lukashenka will no 
longer be able to maintain his image as the guarantor of Belarus’ stable socio-economic 
development. The majority of voters will likely believe that if the increased price of gas does 
not result in an economic down turn everything will be fine without Lukashenka.3 Thus, it 
will be rather hard for him to explain the need for his lifelong presidency and justify the 
cruelty of his regime. This was the main reason why Lukashenka persistently kept Belarus 
from paying a market price (or higher) for Russian natural gas from 2007. Nevertheless, the 
latest steps taken by the Belarusian government, such as using nuclear energy (highly 
controversial in Belarus due to Chernobyl), shows a more desperate shift in the energy 
policy of Belarus.    
 
Due to his close contacts with representatives of the Russian ruling elite, Lukashenka is well 
aware of Russian foreign policy mechanisms and the mood within the political elite groups 
and civil society. He believed that the current political situation would not allow Moscow to 
exert strong pressure on Belarus, so the Kremlin’s decision to take a hard line on both gas 
and crude oil surprised him. Nevertheless, the temporary deterioration of the Belarus-Russia 
relationship, and even the prospect of further gas or crude oil cut-offs, does not frighten him 
too much as he will eventually take advantage of any conflict in order to discredit the 
Russian authorities and improve his own image as an enemy of the Russian oligarchs (e.g. 
the Kremlin) and a persistent supporter of Belarus’ sovereignty and independence. 
 
Four Reasons for Friendship Forever 
 
1) The mood and attitude of the Russian political elite and civil society and the 
political situation in Russia 
 
Authoritarian methods have been revived during Vladimir Putin’s presidency. Russian mass 
media have been systematically suffocated by the authorities (“NTV” and “TV-6” TV channels 
and a number of media holdings are controlled by the government). Large oil companies 
such as YUKOS and Sibneft, machinery manufacturer Avtovaz and others have been 
nationalized and deprived of their status as representatives of the country’s large-scale 
business sector. Russian legal institutions have also become extremely dependent on the 
Kremlin. 
 
Opposition4 is gradually being pushed out of the political arena and media space. 5 The 
“Kremlin projects”6 have become full participants in the electoral process. The single-party 
system is being revitalized. For example, that “United Russia” as well as “Rodina”, “Party of 
Life”7and “Pensioners Party”8 were launched in September 2006 to replace the “non-
efficient” leftists is not representative of civil society, but bureaucratic figures, members of 
the ruling elite, of the Kremlin, in fact.  
 
                                                 
3 According to a number of Belarusian experts (for example, employees of the Institute of Economy within the 
Ministry of Economy, Alexander Gotovsky and Vladimir Kolupaev), the establishment of market gas prices for 
Belarus is unlikely to lead to economic collapse. The Belarusian economy will easily adapt to the new environment. 
4 “Soyuz Pravyh Sil” and “Yabloko”, supporters of liberal values, and communists (KPRF and Trudovaya Russia), 
struggling for the rebirth of the Soviet Union. 
5 We actually mean the pushing out of TV broadcasts. Political TV talk shows with opposition are predominantly 
aired about midnight.  
6 LDPR, headed by Zhirinovsky was the first Kremlin project, followed by “Rodina” and “United Russia” 
7 Partiya Zhizni is headed by Sergey Mironov, representative of St. Petersburg political elite, Putin’s protégé, 
Chairman of the Upper House of Parliament. 
8 According to Russian sociologists, this association may receive the support of 20% of voters. 
The decentralization of power has failed to become a political principle in Russia. The 
parliament is a de-facto branch of the state administration. The term “Head of State” has 
acquired a specific, narrow meaning. A number of state officials believe the president’s 
portrait should be on the wall of every office. Most ardent enthusiasts of the current regime 
even have the president’s bust at their work place. Putin is being pushed (mainly by siloviki) 
to make amendments to the constitution and run for a third term. 
 
Civil society institutions are being systematically pressured. NGOs are totally controlled by 
state bureaucracy. State-controlled organizations represent public opinion. The Kremlin is 
largely promoting the Nashi government-linked movement, which is in fact a prototype of 
Komsomol. The Russian state is “devouring” civil society. Moreover, the process is being 
ideologically and constitutionally legitimized. The project of “sovereign democracy” was 
elaborated by supporters of Russia’s “specific path and mission”, who widely criticized 
former president Yeltsin and the liberals. On August 3, 2006 one of the leaders of United 
Russia, Moscow’s mayor and a prominent politician Yury Luzhkov, made a public statement 
saying that Georgia and Ukraine are not “true” sovereign democracies. “They exist on 
western donations and are controlled by Western authorities”, he said. “But Russia is 
building a true democracy. We do not depend on anybody and anything. We follow our own 
path”. The idea of independence and Russia’s “own path” is becoming widely popular in 
Russia, as are Lukashenka’s policies in Belarus.  
 
Currently, three political powers shape Russia’s ideological landscape. “United Russia”, one 
of the most influential Kremlin groups, promotes the idea of a “sovereign”, “controlled” 
democracy along with semi-official9 allies “Rodina”, “Party of Life” and the even more radical 
LDPR and KPRF. The political isolation of liberal forces such as “Soyuz Pravyh Sil (The 
Alliance of Center Right Forces)” and “Yabloko” and the persecution of large-scale business 
representatives (Kodorkovsky’s case, for example) greatly undermined their attempts to 
develop a market approach to the relationships between Russia and post-Soviet states.10 
Supporters of “sovereign democracy” and Russia’s “specific path” of development adhere to 
their own market principles. They believe gas and energy are to be used as a political tool, 
especially against “politically unfriendly” post-Soviet states. 
 
The implementation of “sovereign democracy” is hardly feasible without close, “manageable” 
allies who support Russia’s foreign policy initiatives. This has been ensured by the control of 
energy and gas prices, as well as supply volumes. Nevertheless, due to the feeling in 
Moscow that Belarus has nowhere to go and that Lukashenka’s assertive “nation” building 
(which is basically a modern version of Soviet Belarus) should be stopped, but also due to 
the economic interests of energy supplier Gazprom, through various tools Russian policy 
retains its overall aim toward its main ally.    
 
Meanwhile, Lukashenka is trying hard to improve his own hand despite the fact that he does 
not seem to have any bargaining chips. One of his strongest assets is the fact that Russian 
business retains close ties to the Belarusian economy, employing about 10 million workers. 
As such, any increase in gas prices will negatively affect Russia’s labor market. Any 
deterioration of the socio-economic situation in Belarus will undermine Russia’s influence 
among post-Soviet states. In addition, residents of the south-eastern regions of Ukraine are 
closely watching Belarus’ socio-economic development. This creates an uncertain 
atmosphere. On the one hand, the Kremlin and Gazprom are frightening Lukashenka, and on 
                                                 
9 Semi-official, given the status, contacts and ideology of the party leaders. 
10 They also deemed implementation of universal democratic principles as the only right approach to Russia’s 
political and economic development. 
the other, representatives of the Russian political elite are reassuring him that Russia is still 
on his side.  
 
2) Aggravating differences between Russia and the West  
 
Many among Belarus’ political opposition, as well as some experts, believe that the Belarus-
Russia relationship has an overwhelmingly economic character and thus has no real 
influence on Russian foreign policy. Actually, the opposite is true.   
 
Since 1996, Russia has steadfastly opposed NATO expansion to the east and the integration 
of post-Soviet states with the EU. However, during Yeltsin’s time in power Russia was mainly 
preoccupied with domestic policy issues. It was a period of political and economic transition. 
Russia’s attempts to resist Western expansion were inconsistent and chaotic. Yeltsin’s Russia 
was concerned with establishing a fruitful relationship with the West within post-Soviet 
territory. Putin’s Russia is seeking to regain control over those states that have not yet 
joined the EU and NATO and remain relatively independent. 
 
The term “non-regional forces” (e.g. the EU and NATO) is being widely used by senior 
Russian state officials. The creation of GUAM (Georgia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine and Moldova), 
the “orange” revolution in Ukraine, the prospect of Georgia’s integration in NATO is 
explained by the “destructive” impact of these “non-regional forces”. After South Ossetia, 
Abkhazia, and Transnistria resorted to the Kremlin’s help when organizing protests against 
NATO’s expansion in Crimea, they have often been referred to as “Russia’s territory”. An 
influential Russian politician, deputy head of the parliament Sergey Baburin, is actively 
advocating the right to self-determination for pro-Russian states (Ukrainian Crimea, for 
example) and post-Soviet states. According to him, Russia should “lend a helping hand” to 
its “brothers” and allow South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Crimea and Transnistria to join the Russian 
state while, for example, the Chechen people living on its territory should be denied the 
right to self-determination. This opinion is also shared by Konstantin Zatulin, director of the 
CIS (Moscow) and deputy of the parliament. In addition, the idea of “non-regional forces” 
and “Russian lands” is becoming widely popular within Russian society. Rumors and reports 
suggest that buying land and property in Ukraine (especially in the Crimea) and elsewhere is 
one of the most important tasks for Russian embassies as well as wealthy Russian 
businessmen.  
 
The idealized images of a strong state not only persist in Russia, but Putin’s new Russian 
superpower has been built on this tradition. Nevertheless, even the strongest state largely 
depends on the loyalty of its neighbors. The terms “Russia’s specific path”, “independence” 
and “sovereign democracy” imply the “unimpeded” (e.g. free of Western influence) 
development of Russian civil society and a corresponding foreign policy.11 Unlike the Soviet 
Union, Russia tries to avoid confrontation with the West (also due to the lack of relevant 
resources). However, Russia’s willingness to pursue its own “independent” political course 
has already generated many contradictions in its political relationships, mainly with the US. 
Here are the main conflicting issues between Russia and the West:  
 
Iran: On October 4, 2001 Russia and Iran signed a bilateral agreement on long-term 
military and technical collaboration worth $7 billion. Over the next ten years Moscow is 
committed to deliver modern weapons to Iran. There are no records of similar agreements 
between the two countries. However, illegal transactions might have taken place. The US 
                                                 
11 Herewith we cite the statement of Sergey Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs, at the Council on Foreign Relations 
on September 26 in Los Angeles. He declared, “Russia has formulated its own vision of democratic development 
and will steadily follow independent foreign policy”. 
imposed sanctions on several Russian scientific research institutes allegedly involved in 
sharing secret information about missile construction and nuclear technologies. Russia and 
China are suspected of contributing to the development of Iranian missiles (Iran successfully 
launched Shihab-2 missiles which are able to reach targets in Israel). Russia is contributing 
significantly to Iran’s military development in order to impede the US/NATO expansion to 
Central Asia via the Caspian Sea.  
 
Russia may use cooperation with Iran to exercise control over the Caspian energy carriers 
which transfer by way of Transcaucasia. Russia-Iran military and technical cooperation is 
largely deteriorating the situation in the Middle East due to Iran’s military support for radical 
Islamic organizations. Nevertheless, instability in the Middle East, the area of the largest 
oilfields and pipelines plays into the hands of Russia as an oil-producing country. Another 
alarming issue is Russia-Iran nuclear cooperation. Russia is helping to build a nuclear power 
station in Bushera and advocating Iran’s nuclear interests. On September 25, Iranian 
president Golyam Reza Agazade made a statement saying that the government is planning 
to build two more nuclear power stations. Iran’s nuclear development is threatening the 
global non-proliferation agreement. However, due to Russia’s support it is impossible to 
exert pressure on Tehran. 
 
China: The US and the EU have banned arms delivery to China. However, China remains 
Russia’s most important arms buyer, spending $3-4 billion annually. Washington believes 
that arms delivery to China deteriorates the situation in the Asia-Pacific region. In particular, 
the US and Taiwan, both opposing Chinese expansion in the Asia-Pacific region, are greatly 
preoccupied by Russian deliveries of Garpun anti-warship missiles.   
 
Other differences between the US and Russia, such as the divergence in their attitude to the 
Chaves regime in Venezuela appears to be much less important. However, political conflicts 
with Syria and Libya are still taking place. The situation in Iraq receives much less attention 
than it did during the war. The Kremlin-controlled mass media declares that Moscow still 
remembers the loss of $40 billion due to the break-up of the Hussein regime. Nevertheless, 
the failure of the US mission in Iraq has been widely echoed by Russian mass media. 
 
Russia’s economic, political and, consequently, military development will further complicate 
its relationship with the West and aggravate current conflicts. Russia’s achievements in 
“sovereign democracy” building and certain improvements in the economic and political 
situation of the country have deteriorated Russia-West relations in regards to the post-
Soviet sphere of influence. The most alarming contradictions are as follows: 
 
The prospect of NATO expansion: NATO expansion toward Central European and Baltic 
states was followed by high-level debates regarding the possible deployment of US forces in 
the territory of new NATO members. However, Russia is mainly preoccupied by the prospect 
of US military deployment in Poland, near Russia’s Kaliningrad region and western borders of 
the Collective Security Treaty Organization.12 In particular, NATO announced the deployment 
of air-force bases in Byala-Podlyaska, which is 35 km from the Belarusian border. Russia has 
been widely demonstrating a negative attitude toward NATO expansion, and especially of 
late, toward the placement of a missile defense system in the Czech Republic and Poland. 
Between 1996 and 1999 Russian authorities repeatedly declared that NATO’s march 
eastward largely affected EU integrity. Allegedly, this factor has been impeding mutually 
beneficial cooperation between Russia and the West. Later on, these allegations were 
echoed by Igor Ivanov, Minister of Foreign Affairs during the Putin presidency, and Sergey 
Lavrov, the current minister. Indeed, NATO expansion eastward greatly limits Russia’s 
                                                 
12 Russia considers ODKB to be an important mechanism tailored to the needs of national defense. 
influence among post-Soviet states. The survey of pro-Kremlin analysts clearly 
demonstrates the political views of the Russian ruling elite. While pro-Yeltsin political figures 
(in particular, Sergey Karaganov, Head of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, one of 
the largest Russian think tanks) keep promoting the idea of constructive dialogue and 
strategic partnership between the West and Russia, many new-generation analysts insist 
Russia should follow the path of strategic resistance. Their presence in the Russian mass 
media (mainly TV) and their ability to influence political decision-making ensure continued 
support for the “sovereign democracy” course. One of these supporters, the Director of the 
Institute of Globalization Issues (Moscow) Michael Delyagin, in his book “Globalization 
practices: games and rules of the modern epoch”, declared that “The Kremlin’s growing 
independence from economic and political international community reveals that the US is 
losing its grip on political  processes in Russia”. This “new generation” goes so far as to say 
that if Russia keeps following its foreign/domestic political course it is likely to become an 
object of NATO’s military aggression.13 
 
Caspian/Caucasus: Russia is determined to establish control of the Caspian pipeline in 
Georgia, to impede the country’s accession to NATO, and to not let the West expand its 
influence in Central Asia via Transcaucasia and the Caspian Sea. To achieve this, Russia – 
through the so-called “frozen conflicts” in Abhazia and South-Ossetia – has annexed part of 
Georgia’s territory. With the help of allies in Georgia, Russia is trying to overthrow 
Saakashvili’s government. Officially, Moscow granted political asylum to Igor Georgadze, ex-
Minister of National Security of Georgia, the leader of Spravedlivost (Justice) party, the son 
of Panteleimon Georgadze and former First Secretary of the GSSR Central Committee.14 
Georgian authorities have been demanding his extradition since 1995. In the beginning of 
2006, Georgian law-enforcement bodies prevented a coup by pro-Russian oppositional 
organizations (Spravedlivost appears to be the most influential one). 
 
The Kremlin is openly offering support to pro-Russian South Ossetia and Abkhazia.15 Every 
adult Ossetin/Abkhazian has a Russian passport, pensions are close to those in Russia and 
significant economic support is available.16 The president of South Ossetia, Eduard Kokoity, 
usually delivers his speeches with the Russian state flag behind him, while on May 30, 2006 
he appealed to the constitutional court to deliver proof that South Ossetia has always been a 
part of the Russian Federation. For a long time Russian authorities avoided making public 
statements regarding their plans for South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Preoccupied with 
Chechnya, they repeatedly pledged their respect for Georgia’s territorial integrity.17 After the 
physical elimination of numerous Chechen insurgents, including the last president of 
Chechnya, Aslan Maskhadov, the Kremlin has finally changed its behavior and increased 
pressure on Georgia.  
                                                 
13 Such conclusions were echoed by Russian senior officials. On September 26, 2006 at the Council on Foreign 
Relations Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov stated that “quickly recovered independence of our 
foreign policy course is deteriorating relations between the West and the Russian Federation due to the American 
government’s negative attitude toward these changes”. 
14 During the Soviet period, KGB officer Igor Georgadze served his mission in Afghanistan. On June 24, 2006 during 
a live TV broadcast he declared that Georgia should not rely on western support and disregard the country which in 
fact saved Georgians from physical elimination and was always ready to lend a helping hand. Georgia needs to be 
prevented from making a fatal mistake. Georgadze speaks Russian without an accent, which is very unusual. He 
doesn’t even look Georgian. His mother was probably of Russian origin. 
15 Ossetians living in South (Georgia) and North (Russia) Ossetia belong to the same ethnic group. Abkhazians are 
ethnically close to Adygeis, who live in Russia. 
16 Abkhazia is enjoying free wheat supplies from Russia (in particular, Krasnodar region). South Ossetia has 
received large amounts of Russian humanitarian aid. Besides, Russia has greatly contributed to the development of 
the tourist sector in Abkhazia. Russian TV channels have made the country a popular travel destination. Russian 
entrepreneurs and enterprises are buying real estate in Abkhazia. The Sochi-Suhumi railways are being rebuilt and 
a lot of new roads are being constructed in Abkhazia. 
17 Otherwise Russia would be forced to recognize Chechnya’s right to self-determination. 
 
After Kokoity’s appeal, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared that the territorial 
integrity of a state, as well as a nation’s right to self-determination, would be fully respected 
according to the principles of international law. On July 5, 2006 during a press conference 
with western TV journalists Putin stated that the right to self-determination was one of the 
bases of international law and that every nation should determine its own way. He 
mentioned that this applies equally to Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria. “When they 
say, Kosovo and Abkhazia/South Ossetia or Transnistria are all different cases, we call it 
double standards, and it is not acceptable”, he added. As regards the question of Chechnya, 
Putin mentioned that a national referendum had been held and Chechnya was declared an 
integral part of the Russian Federation.18 If Georgia is hesitating to announce itself a part of 
Russia, a referendum should take place as well, he added. Thus he has made clear that if 
the West agrees to recognize the independence of Kosovo (e.g. its unification with Albania), 
Russia may annex Georgia’s northern regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This could 
further be applied to Transnistria, and possibly, Crimea and eastern regions of Ukraine. If 
Kosovo is not granted independence, Russia will continue to incorporate insurgent Georgian 
regions. 
 
The following facts demonstrate Russia’s willingness to retain annexed South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia: On July 5, 2006 Georgian President Saakashvili met US president George W. 
Bush. During his visit, Saakashvili asked Bush to support Georgia’s independent political 
course. Bush once again declared that Georgia is welcome to join NATO. On July 6th the 
deputies of the Upper House of the Russian Parliament unanimously voted for permission to 
send troops to potentially dangerous regions to protect Russian citizens. If pro-Russian 
political figures come to power in Georgia, the Russian Federation will establish total control 
of the Caspian oil pipeline and, consequently, greatly expand its influence in Azerbaijan and 
Kazakhstan. It is noteworthy that the geo-political status of the latter is particularly 
important for Russia. Thus, the domination of pro-Russian political forces within the 
Georgian government will ensure the expansion of Russia’s influence in post-Soviet 
territories, including Transcaucasia and Central Asia. These geo-political changes will 
definitely be considered by East-European oil buyers.  
 
Russia and Ukraine: In order to achieve this goal Russia is widely using its economic 
leverage, e.g. through the suspension or discontinuation of natural gas supplies. Russia’s 
decision to establish a reasonable market-oriented gas price was severely criticized by 
Western governments. “If Western partners are truly willing to support Ukraine they are 
welcomed to pay the difference between the real and market price. This could be called a 
fair market approach”, Putin declared on July 5, 2006. Still, Moscow is enlisting the support 
of pro-Russian south-eastern regions of Ukraine19 in order to impede the country’s 
integration into the EU and NATO. If Ukraine keeps following its path toward EU integration, 
the Donetsk, Lugansk and Crimea regions will likely support the idea of unification with 
Russia. A similar scenario was about to take place on the eve of the “orange” revolution in 
Ukraine.   
 
Russia and Transnistria: The Kremlin is doing its best to impede Moldova’s entry into the 
EU and NATO. At the end of March 2006 Russia banned the import of Georgian and 
Moldavian wines due to the alleged high content of pesticides and heavy metals, which 
negatively affected the development of Moldova’s economy as a result of the interruption of 
                                                 
18 Putin was obviously cunning: occupied Chechens could hardly express a free opinion. 
19 Many ethnic Russians reside in industrial regions of Eastern Ukraine (about 59%, Ukrainians - 25%, 12% - 
Crimean Tatars).  Ethnic Russians constitute a major mart of the peninsula’s population (up to 59%, 25% 
Ukrainian, 12% Crimean Tatars). Anti-NATO feelings in Crimea coincide with Russian “domination” in the region. 
wine production at factories.20 As a result, Moldova’s industrial growth rate decreased by 
5.5% (from 6.5% to 1%). Obviously, Russia’s ban of wine imports is politically motivated. 
Georgian and Moldavian wines have always been of much better quality than those produced 
in Russia’s southern regions. Interestingly, Russian politicians do not deny the political 
character of the ban. Of note, on April 19, 2006 parliamentary deputy and representative of 
the “Edinaya Rossia” fraction Nikolay Gonchar, stated unequivocally that the ban of wine 
imports from Georgia and Moldova as well as Jackson-Vanick’s related amendment was a 
political measure.  
 
The Russian ban on wine imports (a major part of Moldova’s GDP) and the gas price increase 
were supposed to re-align Moldova’s political course with Russian interests. On September 
17, 2006 a national referendum was held in Transnistria. Officially, although not yet 
confirmed, as many as 90% of voters supported unification with Russia. As a result, Moscow 
will increase political and economic pressure on Moldova.  
 
Russia and Uzbekistan: Having supported the regime of Islam Karimov after the Andijan 
events, Russia (backed by China and Iran) declared itself an alternative source of geo-
political global influence in Central Asia. In May, 2005 during the suppression of the rebellion 
of Islamic fundamentalists in Andijan, many Uzbek citizens were killed.21 Due to political 
pressure from the US and the EU, the Karimov regime changed its foreign policy. Hoping to 
receive political and economic dividends from the West, Tashkent pledged support to the 
US-led anti-terrorist operation in Afghanistan and provided its southern military bases for 
use by American military forces. Due to Washington’s negative feedback concerning the 
events in Andijan, Uzbekistan gave up its membership in GUAM. On June 23, 2006 at the 
Minsk Summit of Collective Security Treaty Organization, Uzbek president Islam Karimov 
declared that Uzbekistan was set to resume CSTO membership.22 After renewing its CSTO 
membership, Karimov agreed to withdraw US troops from Uzbekistan. President Putin’s 
political behavior at the summit demonstrated that he was satisfied with the Uzbek 
authorities political maneuvering. Having greeted Uzbekistan as a new member of CSTO, 
Russia once again expressed its commitment to support CIS governments regardless of their 
political differences and current conflicts with the West. A number of other Central-Asian 
states are also facing tough relations with the West. Kazakhstan is accused of suppressing 
opposition. Turkmenistan’s regime is being severely criticized by the West. Together with 
China and Iran, Russia is announcing itself as a geo-political alternative to Western 
democratization within the post-Soviet sphere. 
 
In conclusion, the Lukashenka regime pledges full support to the Kremlin in its political 
conflicts with Western democracies and ensures the expansion of Russia’s influence in post-
Soviet areas. Due to its geo-political status, Belarus enjoys international influence which is 
absolutely inconsistent with its economic potential and population size. Russian support for 
Belarus, as a sovereign state and a subject of international law, is way more important for 
Russia than the support of Belarus is for the Russian Federation. The reasons are as follows:  
 
Belarus and the “axis of evil”: On behalf of the Kremlin Belarus renders political and 
economic support to some of the states of the “axis of evil”.  Lukashenka has actively 
supported the Serbian government on previous occasions. On March 3, 1999, right before 
NATO’s D-day, Zhivodin Yevanovich, Serbian Minister of Foreign Affairs, officially visited 
                                                 
20 Also, the import ban negatively affected the Georgian economy. Half of Georgia’s population is engaged in 
agriculture. 
21 According to various data around 500 Uzbek citizens were killed in Andijan. 
22 According to several experts, CSTO is an anti-American/NATO organization. CSTO is actually the focial point of a 
number of Russian interests. Kazakhstan is also a member of CSTO, but interestingly, the US is in fact Kazakhstan’s 
major investor, while Russia is playing a humble role in its economic development. 
Belarus. He was accepted by Lukashenka, Sheiman and general Chumakov, Belarus’ Minister 
of Defense, whose Russian citizenship is due to be announced. In fact, he was sent23 on 
assignment to Belarus. Yevanovich and Chumakov held confidential talks which resulted in 
the signing of an agreement on military aid for Serbia. Under the terms of the agreement 
Belarus committed to supply industrial facilities, dispatch experts from the Borisov tank 
repair factory to modernize Serbian tanks and train Serbian air-force officials24 at the 
Belarus Military Academy. In 2000, Lukashenka officially visited Libya. During his meeting 
with Kaddafi, Lukashenka stated that “the parties are unanimous in their assessments of 
global policy issues”. This visit resulted in the sending of experts from the Borisov anti-
aircraft/missile equipment repair factory to Libya.25 In the winter of 2002-2003, immediately 
prior to the deployment of US coalition forces in Iraq, Iraqi officials repeatedly visited 
Belarus. Allegedly, the parties negotiated the terms of trade and military cooperation. In 
fact, they primarily discussed the delivery of Belarusian and Russian arms. The training of 
Iraqi military officials at the Belarus Military Academy is another example of such 
cooperation.  
 
Lukashenka’s acquaintance with anti-western political leaders resulted in further arms 
deliveries.  According several foreign think-tanks, Belarus is one of the top 10 arms 
exporters in the world. A significant portion of Belarusian arms are illegally delivered to 
Middle East states, including Syria and Libya. There are records of arm transactions with 
Sudan and Iran. Lukashenka is well known to have friendly relations with the Iranian 
government.  
 
According to several claims, the Lukashenka regime delivers military supplies to 
international terrorist organizations. Apparently, Lukashenka relies on the assistance of 
mediators who closely cooperate with international terrorists (including those from Syria, 
Iran, Sudan, etc.). On one hand, the military cooperation of the Lukashenka regime with 
countries in conflict with western governments can be explained by economic interests. 
During the Soviet period, Belarus was home to significant arms factories and other military 
facilities. During his conversation with the author of this article, former military official 
Vladimir Nistyuk, deputy head of Gromada (Belarus’ Socio-Democratic Party), who has close 
contacts with the Belarusian military elite and is allegedly in touch with the Minister of 
Defense, Leonid Maltsev, declared that Belarus is still exporting arms and ammunition from 
the WWII period.  
 
Nevertheless, the income from arms sales has never made it to the Belarusian state budget 
and the transactions are not officially recorded. The Belarusian expert community believes 
the money is laundered through the officially registered “Presidential Fund”. Obviously, 
income from arms sales comprises a major part of the economic welfare of Lukashenka’s 
regime, including, for example, Presidential Security Services, KGB, Office of Public 
Prosecutor and Ministry of Internal Affairs.26 Ultimately, arms sales ensure the loyalty of 
state officials and the proper implementation of their functions within Belarus’ authoritarian 
system. On the other hand, arms deliveries ensure the popularity of Lukashenka’s political 
course and the support of the Non-Alignment Movement. A number of states (except for the 
EU and the US) might become potential buyers of Belarusian arms.  
 
                                                 
23 After his retirement, Chumakov returned to Russia. That was the time when Lukashenka was “flirting” with the 
Kremlin in order to assume the post of President of Russia-Belarus union state. 
24 PVO in Russian means anti-aircraft defense system. We are talking about training for Serbian military officials 
where they have been taught to use Russian C-300 PVO complexes. 
25 During the Soviet period Libya purchased mainly Russian arms. 
26 We assume Belarusian senior state officials do not keep their money in western banks. For example, Russia 
appears to be a very much safer place for such transactions. 
Therefore, one can assume that Belarus replaces Russia in arms sales when the Kremlin is 
not interested in declaring itself as an arms exporter. The Lukashenka regime guarantees 
the proper maintenance of Russian military equipment27 and the availability of military 
experts in the event that Russia is unable due to certain political and economic 
circumstances. The employment of Belarusian arms experts in Libya is one example of such 
cooperation, while the Belarus Military Academy welcomes those rejected by Russian military 
educational institutions. 
 
Besides, Belarusian enterprises including Minsk Wheel Tractors,36 several branches of 
Integral Research and Production Association37 and Belarus’ Optical-Mechanical Association38 
play an indispensable role in Russia’s military development.39 According to different sources, 
about 15% of Russia’s military-industrial complexes are produced by Belarusian enterprises. 
The loss of Belarus and the diversification of Belarusian military production will negatively 
affect the development of Russia’s military-industrial potential and adversely affect its own 
foreign policy.  
 
Belarusian authorities are promoting the idea of a “multi-polar” world: During 
sessions of the UN General Assembly and the Non-Alignment Movement (Havana, 2006), 
Lukashenka supported the political and economic interests of Russia, China, Iran, Venezuela 
and other states which he considers Belarus’ reliable allies. He adjusts Belarus’ foreign and 
domestic policy to their national interests and protects their right for “unimpeded”, “West-
free” development. In Havana, Lukashenka declared that the Non-Alignment Movement 
needs to expand its influence and “independent states should actively resist foreign political 
and economic pressure and military aggression”. This clearly demonstrates that Lukashenka 
is seeking diplomatic allies for Russia. 
 
Lukashenka has been playing the role of a staunch defender of Russia’s foreign policy 
interests.  By supporting Russia Lukashenka pursues several goals:  
 
• By playing the role of Russia’s reliable ally and defender of its national interests 
Lukashenka ensures Russia’s political and economic support for Belarus 
 
• By contributing to the aggravation of political conflicts between the West and other 
countries he hopes to limit western influence in Belarus 
 
• By expanding his foreign influence Lukashenka is seeking to resist western political 
pressure 
 
• He is trying to enlist political and economic support for those facing a tough 
relationship with the West (for example, he managed to attract significant Chinese 
investment and boost commodity turnover with Iran) 
 
NATO’s expansion eastward increased the importance of Belarus as a reliable ally 
for Russia: The more differences that were uncovered between Russia and the West the 
more persistent Lukashenka was in pushing Russia to fulfill its treaty obligations. NATO’s 
expansion eastward and the prospect of Ukraine and Georgia joining the Alliance is 
Lukashenka’s strongest argument in his dialogue with Russia.  
 
Officials in Minsk, still, despite the claimed dialogue with the West, never missed a chance to 
take advantage of political conflicts between Russia and the West in order to negotiate 
                                                 
27 During the Soviet period, Belarus created a lot of maintenance facilities, for aviation, tank, anti-aircraft and 
missile equipment. 
better gas prices and solve other important issues. Thus, after the US announced its 
willingness to set up military bases in Central Asia, Belarus refused to further negotiate the 
sale of controlling shares in Belarusian enterprises. Again, after receiving information about 
the possible deployment of US military bases on Polish territory, Minsk immediately 
reviewed the terms of the Beltransgaz stock agreement.  
 
Lukashenka is not only taking advantage of political differences between Russia and the 
West to ensure the safety of his regime, but does everything possible to aggravate them and 
increase the tension. He is constantly pointing out the danger of NATO’s expansion. Clearly, 
due to geographic reasons, Russia will be unable to protect its Western borders in case 
Belarus dissolves the treaty.  
 
Thus, Russia is facing a tough choice - either it will continue to establish a new relationship 
with NATO in accordance with the principles of strategic partnership, to further develop 
market relations with post-Soviet states and recognize the sovereignty and integrity of 
Belarus or follow the path of resistance, discriminating between those willing to join NATO 
and the EU and those who are not, while continuing to promote Belarus-Russia unification 
plans.  
 
Having failed to settle Ukrainian, Georgian and Moldavian issues while being unable to 
stabilize relations with the West, Russia is likely to lose Belarus. However, the Kremlin 
realizes that the successful implementation of its foreign policy is impossible without reliable 
allies both within and beyond the post-Soviet sphere of influence. 
 
3) The lack of influential pro-Russian political figures within Belarus’ ruling elite 
and society 
  
Apparently, top Russian officials are well aware of the 2001 cadre rotation within Belarus’ 
ruling elite and major state institutions. They are also aware that the idea of Belarus 
becoming a part of the Russian Federation has little support within Belarusian society. Just 
like the ruling elite, civil society representatives unanimously oppose the sale of controlling 
shares in Belarusian enterprises to Russian interests. Thus, Moscow’s current policy toward 
Belarus is not welcomed by the Belarusian ruling elite. Failure to establish control over 
Belarus’ pipeline could dramatically affect the Russia-Belarus relationship, leading to the 
realization of Belarusian nationalization (under Lukashenka’s term) and could even 
destabilize the political situation in Russia before the upcoming elections. These are the most 
important bargaining chips for Lukashenka’s regime in its relations with Russia.   
 
4) To compensate losses Belarus might “charge” 
 
In his speech on September 29, Lukashenka underscored that Russia “is enjoying free-of-
charge transportation of its goods through the territory of Belarus” (around 100 billion tons). 
He believes Belarus can charge a transit fee of $10/ton. If Russia decides to establish 
market prices for natural gas supplies to Belarus, the Belarusian government may increase 
the rental fees for military bases in Gantsevichi and Vileika and look for other ways to 
“charge” Russia.  
 
 
 
